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Abstract: Research in corporate governance and labour law has been
characterised by a disjuncture in the way that scholars in each field are
addressing organisational questions related to the business enterprise.
While labour has eventually begun to shift perspectives from aspirations to
direct employee involvement in firm management, as has been the case in
Germany, to a combination of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ strategies involving
pension fund management and securities litigation, it remains to be seen
whether this new stream will unfold as a viable challenge to an otherwise
exclusionary shareholder value paradigm. At the same time, recent
suggestions made by Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery
Court to dare think about potentially shared commitments between
management and labour underline the viability of attempts at moving the
corporate governance debate beyond the confines of corporate law proper.
This paper takes the questionable divide between management and
labour within the framework of a limiting corporate governance concept as
a starting point to explore the institutional dynamics of the corporation,
thereby building on the theory of the innovative enterprise as developed by
management theorists Mary O’Sullivan and William Lazonick. Largely
due to the sustained distance between corporate and labour law scholars,
neither group has effectively addressed their common blind spot: a better
understanding of the business enterprise itself. In the midst of an
unceasing flow of affirmations of the finance paradigm of the corporation,
on the one hand, and ‘voice’ strategies by labour, on the other, it seems to
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fall to management theorists to draw lessons from the continuing
coexistence of different forms of market organisation, in which companies
appear to thrive. Exploring the conundrum of ‘risky’ business decisions
within the firm, management theorists have been arguing for the need to
adopt a more sophisticated organisational perspective on companies
operating on locally, regionally and transnationally shaped, and often
highly volatile, market segments. Research by comparative political
economists has revealed a high degree of connectivity between corporate
governance and economic performance without, however, arriving at such
favourable results only for shareholder value regimes. Such findings
support the view that corporate governance regimes are embedded in
differently shaped regulatory frameworks, characterised by distinct
institutions, both formal and informal, and enforcement processes. As a
result of these findings, arguments to disassociate issues of corporate
governance from those of the firm’s (social) responsibility (CSR) have
been losing ground. Instead, CSR can be taken to be an essential part of
understanding a particular business enterprise. It is the merging of a
comparative political economy perspective on the corporation with one on
the organisational features, structures and processes of the corporation that
can help us better understand the distribution of power and knowledge
within the ‘learning firm’.
Keywords: corporate governance, organizational theory, innovative
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Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm:
Contemporary Developments in EU and German
Company Law
Peer Zumbansen*

1.

Introduction

The role of the employee in the corporation is manifold. Starting with their
performance of various functions, determined by the superiors, employees
often play a much more differentiated role in the functioning of an
organisation. It is obvious then that the form of the organisation – a small
or middle-sized firm or a large, publicly traded corporation with
operations around the world – has a direct impact on the role of the
employee. This first observation is important if we want to avoid pursuing
the question ‘what role for employees in the corporation’ in a one-sizefits-all manner. The size, structure, and embeddedness1 of the corporation,
*
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1

For the origin of this concept, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation:
The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York, 1944). It was
subsequently further elaborated with a focus on networks by Mark
Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness’, 91 American Journal of Sociology (1985) p. 481; and Mark
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as recently highlighted again by Sanford Jacoby,2 are directly related to
our assessment of the role and involvement of employees in the
organisation. In turn, the shape of the organisation is driven by
developments in the political economy, of which the corporate, labour law
and industrial relations regimes each form a part. This regulatory
framework is increasingly less a domestic affair. The increased liquidity of
funds available for the financing of corporate operations worldwide has
been undercutting, informing and pushing domestic policy developments.
It is thus no surprise that our view on what are the ‘leading political
economies’ shifts with the particular regime’s aptness and capacity to
adapt to the changing structures of world markets. Two interim
conclusions follow: (1) corporate governance forms part of a larger
regulatory framework which is constantly under pressure of being adapted
at the domestic and, increasingly, transnational level to the capabilities of
global investors and capital flows; and (2) any assessment of the
involvement and role of employees in the firm has to be made with this
complex background and framework in mind.
The following observations provide a few examples in support of the
above two statements. The second section will address the current state of
research into employee involvement in the firm from a comparative
perspective and argue how issues of employee involvement are being
shaped by contemporary developments in corporate governance. The next
section will study in more detail the case of German co-determination in
order to show how a long-held misconception is applied to what is and
what is not ‘bad’ co-determination in German companies. It will also place

2

Granovetter, ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’, 19 J.
Econ. Persp. (2005) p. 33). Critical of the concept is Jens Beckert, The Great
Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic
Sociology, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper
07/1 (2007), who reads ‘The Great Transformation’ as ‘as a social theory’ and
argues that a focus on networks fails to appreciate the more complexly
structured market as framework of economic activity, on the one hand, and to
address Polanyi’s concern with the consequences for ‘social order and
political freedom when economic exchange is organized chiefly through selfregulating markets’, on the other. Ibid., at p. 17.
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and
Employment Relations in Japan and the United States (Princeton, Princeton
University Press 2004).
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this discussion in the context of current EU law-making in the area of
corporate governance. The fourth section, then, will suggest an alternative
perspective on employee involvement in the firm, one primarily informed
by insights provided by management studies, organisational science and
scholars of historical political economy. These scholars suggest a
differentiated understanding of the firm, where managerial success and
economic performance depend on a set of institutional features inside and
outside of the firm, encompassing communication and the creation and
dissemination of knowledge between different levels of employees3 and
between the firm and societal knowledge actors. Couched in a vivid
culture of incentive structures and adaptation techniques, which enhance
collaborative efforts, experimenting and learning, the corporation can thus
be seen as an integral part of a highly differentiated knowledge society.

2.

The political economy of corporate governance

Research into the role and involvement of employees in the contemporary
business corporation, be it a small-scale, domestically or regionally
operating enterprise or a large multinational corporation, reflects the larger
trends in corporate governance and business organisation. We can
differentiate between a human resources approach and a co-determination
or control approach. The latter has been the much discussed model of
German corporate governance, about which we will speak later in more
detail. The former can be found, expressed in a very strong form, in
Japanese corporate law and, in a weaker form, in the US corporate form.
Co-determination comprises different forms of employee involvement in
the management of the company. In contrast, a model focusing on human
resources, can unfold without granting workers substantive input into
management issues of the firm. Japanese corporate governance was hailed
all throughout the 1980s as a model nurturing stable employments, skills
training and intra-firm mobility.4 The human resources manager would
3

4

Granovetter (1985), loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 501: ‘When many employees have long
tenures, the conditions are met for a dense and stable network of relations,
shared understandings, and political conditions to be constructed.’
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany,
Japan, and the United States’, 102 Yale. L. J. (1993) p. 1927. With a view to

3

4

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

regularly be part of the firm’s managerial cohort, given that employee
well-being and the preservation of stable employment relations ranked
high on the Japanese corporate governance agenda. By comparison, in the
United States, human resources have not been considered a crucial or vital
element of corporate governance. Human resources managers regularly
take second or third place after strategic and, more recently, financial
management personnel. The US model can probably best be understood as
a ‘market model’, while for the Japanese one the label ‘organisational
model’ appears most suitable.5 There is certainly a whole host of elements
and issues connected with such a characterisation, and this should already
indicate that any such label hardly captures the complexity of how
decisions are taken in and for the business enterprise. Even less can such
labels fully illustrate the wealth of elements conducive to sustained
economic success. It is here, where business historians, economists,and
corporate governance scholars6 have much to say to all those who perhaps
too quickly assume the triumph of a certain organisational paradigm.7

5
6

the changing dynamics of the political economy of such regulations, see Luke
Nottage, ‘Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads: Variation in
Varieties of Capitalism’, 27 North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation (2001) p. 255; Luke Nottage, ‘Nothing New in the
North-East? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate
Governance’, 2 CLPE Research Paper Series (2007), available at:
<http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; William Lazonick, ‘The Japanese
Economy and Corporate Reform: What Path to Sustainable Prosperity?’, in
William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, eds., Corporate Governance and
Sustainable Prosperity (London/Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan 2002) p.
226.
Ibid., at p. 11.
See, Mary O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate
Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000); Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The innovative
enterprise and corporate governance’, 24 Cambridge Journal of Economics
(2000) p. 393; Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins,
Evolution, Attributes’, 19 J. Econ. Lit. (1981) p. 1537; William Lazonick,
‘Innovative Enterprise and Historical Transformation’, 3 Enterprise & Society
(2002) p. 3; Antoine Rebérioux, ‘The end of history in corporate governance?
A critical appraisal’, Amsterdam Research Centre for Corporate Governance
Regulation, Inaugural Workshop 17-18 December 2004, available at:
<http://www.arccgor.nl/uploads/File/Reberioux%20Amsterdam%202.pdf>;
Friedrich Kübler, ‘A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?’, 11
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As can be observed over the last fifteen years, the German codetermination model and the Japanese human resources model have come
under pressure. First and foremost, global financial liquidity and the ever
shorter periods over which a company’s economic performance is being
assessed seem to leave little room for the long-term orientation that both
German8 and Japanese9 firms have long been endorsing. This development
has been taken by many to reflect on a fundamental convergence of
corporate governance regimes. To explore the validity and the lessons
from such a finding, we need to place these contentions in the context of
comparative assessments of legal structures and their larger institutional,
political, economic and cultural environment.

2.1

Le regard d’autrui: comparative perspectives on company law

The alleged convergence of corporate governance regimes around the
world has been on the mind of investors, policy-makers and scholars for
some years now.10 In fact, whether such a convergence is actually taking

7

8

9
10

Colum. J. Eur. L. (2005) p. 219 at pp. 239-240: ‘But the complex rules and
cumbersome and lengthy procedures are the result of political compromises,
which are very much shaped by the ideas and assumptions of the past; they
show specific features of “path-dependence” and the stickiness of wellestablished institutional arrangements.’
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate
Law’, 89 Geo. L. J. (2001) p. 439.
Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany’, in Klaus J. Hopt and
Eddy Wymeersch, eds., Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford, Oxford
University Press 2003) p. 289.
Nottage (2001), loc. cit. n. 4.
See, e.g., the contributions in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo
Raaijmakers and Luc Renneborg, eds., Corporate Governance Regimes:
Convergence and Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002); Jeffrey
N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe, eds., Convergence and Persistence in Corporate
Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004). A recent
publication laudably takes a more contextual approach and features a
comprehensive section on regulatory structures, bureaucracy and
administrative law: see Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and
Harald Baum, eds., Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States

5

6

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

place has at the same time been contested by many participants in the
debate.11 The trickiness of such assessments of a moving target is certainly
also felt by such a keen observer as The Economist, which in a recent
survey on ‘European Business’ swayed between dismissal of the European
way of doing things, on the one hand, and Europe’s promise to pull
through, on the other.12 Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. noted an
abundance of ‘tired features’ in the ‘so-called corporate governance
debate. ‘Exaggeration is the norm; conversation the exception.’13
At the outset of any assessment of converging regulatory regimes
should lie an appreciation of what it is that is allegedly converging. In

11

12

13

and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford, Oxford University Press
2005).
See, e.g., Sigurt Vitols, ‘Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing
Germany and the UK’, in Peter E. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 337; Sally Wheeler, Corporations
and the Third Way (Oxford, Hart 2002); Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German
Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?’, in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang
Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London, SAGE
1997) p. 33; Ronald Dore, William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Varieties
of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century’, 15 Oxford Review of Economic
Policy (1999) p. 102. See also the contributions in Wolfgang Streeck and
Kozo Yamamura, eds., The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism (Ithaca, Cornell
University Press 2001); and Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds.,
The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press 2003). Harald Baum, ‘Change of
Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience’, in Hopt et al.,
op. cit. n. 10, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=695741>, observes that a
‘gradual and partial de-bundling of the corporatist “Deutschland AG” appears
to be somewhat probable.’ Ibid., at p. 21. See also Kübler, loc. cit. n. 6, at p.
239: ‘slow, piecemeal, cumbersome’ changes of corporate law structures in
Europe.
‘Who are the Champions?’, The Economist, 8 February 2007, available at:
<http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8621685>.
Leo E. Strine Jr., ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of
Corporate Governance’, The Dorsey and Whitney Foundation Lecture, 10
March 2007, forthcoming in J. Corp. Law (2007) p. 3, available at:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=989624>.
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other words, we need to be clear on what we mean by corporate
governance and which aspects of it we currently see changing. Secondly,
we need to be mindful that identifying and evaluating current
developments necessitates a comparison of not only different systems’
formal rules and codifications but also their customs and business
practices. In other words, we need to compare the law on the books and
the law in action. The latter, certainly in the area of corporate governance,
constitutes a wide-ranging variety of informal rules, standards, codes of
conduct and understandings of relevant business communities. While
these form an integral part of a vibrant legal and economic environment,
they are much harder to identify and ascertain by an outside observer.
In this light, I would like to suggest that we attempt our comparison of
existing corporate governance regimes through a combination of
traditional modes of comparative law, that is to say, its instruments, norms
and their functionality, on the one hand,14 and the political economy of
corporate governance, in particular the mix of formal and informal, of
hard and soft laws, rules, standards and practices, on the other.15 This
combination will allow us to appreciate the real changes that are taking
place in different corporate law regimes around the world. In addition,
such a perspective will allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the
currently unfolding trends of convergence and divergence between
corporate governance regimes in regional markets and regulatory spaces
such as the European Union. Here, for example, the particular history of
corporate law harmonisation cannot be properly understood without such a
‘deeper reading’ of the hard-soft forms of corporate law development that
are characterising contemporary changes in the existing regulatory
regimes.16 The European scene for corporate law-making, then, is a
14

15

16

See only Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method in Comparative Law’, in
Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) p. 339.
Peer Zumbansen, ‘Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law’, 12 Eur. L. J. (2006) p.
534, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=902695>.
Simon Deakin, ‘Reflexive Governance and European Company Law,’ CLPE
Research
Paper
Series
(2007),
available
at:
<http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Parallel
Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law’, 13 Indiana Journal of

7
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remarkable laboratory for the study of multilevel and multipolar lawmaking in a politically and culturally contested arena, where different
historically grown and embedded political economies are colliding.17

2.2

What is corporate governance?

Confusion over the potential impact of the alleged convergence in
different corporate governance regimes is what lies at the heart of what we
mean by ‘corporate governance’. The law of corporate governance,
commonly conceived as ‘company law’, ‘corporate law’ or ‘business
associations’, is embedded in a larger regulatory scene that also comprises
fields such as securities regulation, labour law, industrial relations and
insolvency law. But these legal fields are complemented by a set of
institutions that structure the development and practice of corporate
governance. Building on the work of Karl Polanyi in the 1940s,18
economic sociologists focus on the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action
and have been providing a plethora of intriguing case studies and
analysis19 of the ‘institutional, cultural and social contexts’20 in which
commercial transactions are unfolding.21 In order to trace the particular

17

18
19

20
21

Global
Studies
(2006)
p.
261,
available
at:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=902650>.
Martin Rhodes and Bastian van Apeldoorn, ‘Capital Unbound? The
Transformation of European Corporate Governance’, 5 Journal of European
Public Policy (1998) p. 406; Vanessa Edwards, ‘The European Company –
Essential Tool or Eviscerated Dream?’, 40 Common Market Law Review
(2003) p. 443; Peer Zumbansen, ‘European Corporate Law and National
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law’, 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev.
(2004) p. 867.
Polanyi, op. cit. n. 1.
Among the most eminent contributions in this regard is Granovetter (1985),
loc. cit. n. 1. The Director of the Cologne-based Max Planck Institute for the
Study of Societies, Jens Beckert, refers to that article as ‘the “founding
manifesto” of the new economic sociology’. See Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 6.
Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 16.
See Hartmut Berghoff, ‘Markterschließung und Risikomanagement’, 92
Vierteljahreschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2005) p. 141;
Richard Whitley, ‘The Institutional Structuring of Innovation Strategies:
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characteristics of distinct national systems of corporate governance, it is
essential to cast light on the historical, socio-economic and legal
developments that have contributed to national variation. While there is an
important body of literature underlining the relevance of historical
trajectories and the associated competitive advantages of national
differences (the so-called ‘varieties of capitalism’ school22), there is a
wide agreement that these distinct national systems are under severe and
growing pressure towards convergence. The privatisation of public
welfare systems and the increased tendency to base pension and retirement
financing on the capital market23 have coincided with a worldwide
competition for stock market investments.24 As a consequence, the
capacity of traditional stakeholder-oriented systems of corporate
governance to provide the transparency and management control that is

22

23

24

Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of Technological Change in
Different Market Economies’, 21 Organization Studies (2000) p. 855;
William Lazonick, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise’, 24
Comparative Social Research (2007) p. 21.
Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism’, in Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11, at p. 1; David Soskice,
‘Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market
Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary
Marks and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary
Capitalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 101; Dore,
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 11; Robert Boyer, ‘Coherence, Diversity,
and the Evolution of Capitalisms – The Institutional Complementarity
Hypothesis’, 2 Evol. Inst. Econ. Rev. (2005) p. 43 at pp. 45-47; see also
Matthew Allen, ‘The varieties of capitalism paradigm: not enough variety?’, 2
Socio-Economic Review (2004) p. 87.
Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization:
Some Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution of
Corporate Structures’, 2 European Business Organization Law Review (2001)
p. 669; Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the
Securities Markets’, in Hopt and Wymeersch, op. cit. n. 8, at p. 95.
Theodor Baums, ‘Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance:
Inside a Law-Making Process of a Very New Nature’, 2 German Law Journal
(2001),
available
at:
<http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43>;
Theodor
Baums, ‘Company Law Reform in Germany’, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. (2003) p.
181.

9
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necessary for success in the global competition for investments is
increasingly contested.25
Beyond the disputes over the merits of ‘shareholder primacy’, however,
lies the essential question: the nature of the business corporation itself.26
Beyond the ongoing struggle between shareholder- and stakeholderoriented concepts of corporate governance27 lies a wide field of research
concerning the organisational design of today’s corporation as a complex
and innovative institution of social learning.28 The involvement of workers
within the firm is not an issue that can be solely understood against the
background of established and hotly contested models of codetermination.29 Rather, the role of workers in the firm can itself be
25

26

27

28

29

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Toward a Single Model of
Corporate Law?’, in McCahery et al., op. cit. n. 10, at p. 56.
Simon Deakin, ‘Workers, Finance and Democracy’, in Catherine Barnard,
Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris, eds., The Future of Labour Law: Liber
Amicorum Bob Hepple (Oxford, Hart 2003) p. 79.
Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell and Ian Ramsay, ‘Shareholder Value
and Employee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance,
Corporate
Law
and
Labour
Law’
(2005),
available
at:
<http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/researchpapers/Shareholder%20value%20paper%20_23.06.05_.pdf>.
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Die Prozeduralisierung des Unternehmens’, in Dieter
Hart, ed., Privatrecht im ‘Risikostaat’ (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997) p. 137;
Irene Lynch Fannon, Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism: Corporate
Governance and Employee Stakeholding: US and EC Perspectives (Oxford,
Hart 2003); James E. Post, Lee E. Preston and Sybille Sachs, Redefining the
Corporation: Stakeholder Management and Organizational Wealth (Stanford,
Stanford Business Books 2002); Antoine Pirovano, ‘La “boussole” de la
société. Intéret commun, intéret social, intéret de l’entreprise’, Recueil Dalloz
(1997) p. 189; Michel Crozier, L’entreprise à l’écoute. Apprendre le
management post-industriel [Paris, Interéditions 1989] (Points 1994)
[REFERENCE UNCLEAR ???]; Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of
Corporate Social Responsibility: Remarks on the Changing Nature of Firms
and States’, in Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller, eds.,
Transboundary Harm: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006) p. 274; Lazonick, loc. cit. n.
21.
See, e.g., Jens Dammann, ‘The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will
German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?’, 8 Fordham
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explained only with regard to the ways in which the firm is organised to
generate, channel and process fragmented knowledge and innovative
capacity.30 The association of workers’ involvement with a firm’s social,31
intellectual and innovative capital certainly differs from the hitherto held
perception that workers’ involvement in corporate governance is merely
an inefficient check on shareholder power. In fact, switching from a
conflict model, which opposes shareholders against employees, to one of
cooperation and integration of viewpoints, capacities and processes opens
up a new perspective on workers’ involvement. This perspective is
directed at the productive input of workers’ knowledge for a more

30

31

Journal of Corporate & Financial Law (2003) p. 607; Anja Strüve,
‘Deutscher Juristentag 2006’, 1 Legal Latitudes (2007) p. 4 at p. 5, available
at: <www.osgoode.yorku.ca/legallatitudes>. From the ongoing vivid German
discussion, see – for a conciliatory viewpoint – Thomas Raiser,
Unternehmensmitbestimmung vor dem Hintergrund europarechtlicher
Entwicklungen. Gutachten B zum 66. Deutschen Juristentag, Stuttgart 2006
(Munich, Beck 2006) pp. B 111-116; Walter Bayer, ‘Auswirkungen der
Niederlassungsfreiheit nach den EuGH-Entscheidungen Inspire Art und
Überseering auf die deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 534 at pp. 537-538. In contrast, see Michael
Adams, ‘Das Ende der Mitbestimmung’, 27 Zeitschrift für Insolvenzpraxis
(2006) p. 1561; Martin Hennsler, ‘Bewegung in der deutschen
Mitbestimmungsdiskussion – Reformdruck durch Internationalisierung der
Wirtschaft’, Recht der Arbeit (2005) p. 330; Eberhard Schwark,
‘Globalisierung, Europarecht und Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Konflikt’,
49 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 173. With a call not for abandonment but
for reform from a particular focus on the organisational structures within the
company, on the one hand, and the firm’s overall competitiveness based on
business strategy and product quality, on the other: Axel von Werder,
‘Überwachungseffizienz und Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 166.
Antoine Rebérioux, ‘Les marchés financiers et la participation des salariés
aux décisions’, 93 Travail et Emploi (2003) p. 25; Antoine Rebérioux,
‘European Style of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of
Worker Involvement’, 40 Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) p. 111;
Whitley, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 864.
See Ian Jones, Michael Pollitt and David Bek, ‘Multinationals in their
Communities: A Social Capital Approach to Corporate Citizenship Projects’
(2006), available at: <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP337.pdf>.
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efficient governance of the firm.32 The latter differs from the muchdiscussed and often not sufficiently understood form of co-determination
as it exists, for example, in German supervisory boards.33 In these, half of
the board’s members are employee representatives. This has led many
observers to a harsh dismissal of this powerful influence of workers. The
fact remains, however, that the chairman of the supervisory board, usually
a shareholder representative, holds the deciding vote. The confusion about
the parity of powers in the supervisory board is legendary. While the fact
of the chairman’s deciding vote alone should put overly troubled minds to
rest about the purportedly counterproductive effects of co-determined
supervisory boards of large German enterprises, even recent empirical
evidence from German companies indeed seems to suggest that many
managers recognise benefits from the – still – existing system.34
In contrast, the other form of co-determination, which has always
existed in the shadow of the internationally discussed and scrutinised
board co-determination, concerns so-called works councils. These can be
formed in all companies with at least five employees, if at least three have
been with the firm for six months.
Works councils are constituted only by employees and are elected by
secret ballot. They are understood as being a counterpart to management
and play a crucial role in the firing process, seeking together with
management to maintain socially justifiable criteria when selecting
personnel to be laid off. This form of worker involvement, from an
international perspective, has existed in a quiet, neglected corner of the
otherwise heated corporate governance debate. While the law clearly
32

33

34

Ash Amin and Patrick Cohendet, Architectures of Knowledge: Firms,
Capabilities and Communities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p.
113: ‘The first and most obvious “management” step implicit in a model of
learning by doing is clear recognition of the limits of management by design,
of the top-down inculcation of creativity.’
For a concise presentation of the model, see only Katharina Pistor,
‘Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities’, in
Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate
Governance (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press 1999) p. 163.
Martin Höpner, ‘Mitbestimmungskritik hält Prüfung nicht stand’, 6
Mitbestimmung (2004) pp. 54-57, available at: <http://www.mpi-fgkoeln.mpg.de/people/mh/paper/MB_6-2004.pdf>.
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attributes a relatively prominent role to works councils, their institutional
success has been varied.35 Only recently, works councils have acquired a
more positively regarded currency. One of the reasons for this
development was the 1994 introduction of so-called European Works
Councils.36 Their success has been ambiguous at best, assessments ranging
from doubts over unions pursuing their local interests through the newly
established EWCs37 and critical evaluations of the less-empowered EWCs
when compared to the German Betriebsräte38 to a sceptical rejection of
EWCs as yet another mosaic stone in an already losing battle for organised
labour interests.39 While these developments unfolded at the European
level, domestically works councils became increasingly entangled in
pressure systems created by firm management, on the one hand, and trade
unions, on the other. While the latter eventually conceded so-called
opening clauses that would allow variations to the collective agreement to
be stipulated at the firm level, management has taken this opportunity in
recent years to forcefully push employees to enter into unfavourable
agreements in exchange for, say, job security. Effectively, works councils
can now often be seen to accept agreements that contain standards that are
well below the threshold contained in collective agreements. Trade unions
themselves find themselves facing the dilemma that their protest would
potentially drive more of their already weakening members away.40
Taking a step back from this labour interests perspective, however, we
can identify a set of other considerations relating to the works councils.
Here, then, another reason for the increased attention received by works
35

36

37

38

39

40

Manfred Weiss, ‘Labor Law’, in Joachim Zekoll and Mathias Reimann, eds.,
Introduction to German Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International/Munich,
Beck 2006) p. 299 at pp. 311-312.
Paul Marginson, Mark Hall, Aline Hoffmann and Torsten Müller, ‘The
Impact of European Works Councils on Management Decision Making in UK
and US-based Multinationals: A Case Study Comparison’, 42 British Journal
of Industrial Relations (2004) p. 209.
Bob Hancké, ‘European Works Councils and Industrial Restructuring in the
European Motor Industry’, 6 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (2000) p. 35.
Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Internationalization of Industrial Relations in Europe:
Prospects and Problems’, 26 Politics & Society (1998) p. 429.
Thorsten Schulten, ‘European Works Councils: Prospects for a New System
of European Industrial Relations’, 2 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (1999) p. 303.
Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319.
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councils can be seen in the overwhelming pressure on firms to improve
their competitiveness (inseparable from their organisational structure), the
firms’ location and the applicable laws governing salaries, production and
social costs. In this context, works councils are increasingly being
recognised as essential fora for the much-needed negotiation between
management and employees in developing and realising the most costeffective solutions for the firm’s future.41 A crucial aspect, then, is that, at
the same time as the influence of trade unions is diminishing, works
councils might be seen as enforcing their own demise instead of being able
to work against it. In this light, works councils can be seen to be entering a
pact with the devil. Where agreements between management and
employees that are pursued as part of industrial restructuring strategies on
the part of management in highly competitive industries can be reached at
the level of the firm,42 the larger framework of workers’ representation in
a coordinated market becomes economy questionable. In reality,
management can exercise a large degree of pressure on works councils by
connecting demands on lower wages, longer working hours and so on with
threats of relocation, plant closure and the like – all that in exchange for
job security, for the time being.43
This problematic interaction between management and works councils
certainly does not invite a very optimistic view on management-employee
relations. To be sure, it is not the fact that there is such interaction that is
problematic but the reduction of the works council to a transmission belt
that communicates the management’s will to the employee constituency.
In this scenario, chances might remain unused for a resource-based,
fruitful and sustained collaboration between the different power levels
within the corporation.
This last aspect is important. As indicated, there is a second reason for
the recent interest in works councils. In fact, this reason provides a much
more positive perspective on the interaction among the different powers
within the firm. Organisational science scholars and management theorists
41

42
43

Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Works Councils: Consultation,
Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (London, University
of Chicago Press 1996).
Hancké, loc. cit. n. 37, at p. 39.
Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319.
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have been emphasising the economic gains that can result from close
cooperation between management and the firm’s work force. The value of
workers’ input in refining, strengthening and consolidating the firm’s
performance is increasingly recognised in traditionally organised firms
and to a certain degree also in more loosely organised, unbundled or
networked firms. The latter has been described by organisation and labour
scholars as the final deadly blow delivered to workers’ rights, given that
organising becomes more difficult as the firm becomes more
decentralised, as the organisational structure becomes more opaque and
employment relations become more precarious. The combination of
corporate organisation in the twenty-first century firm and the
flexibilisation of work constitutes the dark side of the culture of the new
capitalism.44 At the same time, the very volatility of corporate organisation
in a networked economy must not necessarily lead only to a further
erosion of workers’ power within a firm. More sophisticated studies by
management and organisation theorists show that management in many
cases relies on a healthy and functioning relationship with the firm’s
employees, especially where high profile and fast-changing organisational
patterns require capacities of adaptation and responsiveness.45
As an interim observation, we can say that co-determination exists in
two forms, one involving quasi-parity of shareholder and employee
representatives on the supervisory board of large stock corporations and
the other one involving works councils in small to large firms. The first
form has regularly attracted a lot of international attention and has recently
attracted strong criticism as constituting a so-called ‘competitive
disadvantage’ in the global race for investment. And yet, a closer look at
the voting structures of the board, together with the deliberation practices
long followed by corporate actors in Germany, reveals – as we saw above
– the myth behind the much-discussed German social model, of which codetermination has always been seen as a central pillar.46 The latter model,
located in works councils, has only more recently stepped forward to play
a remarkably differentiated role. On the one hand, works councils have
become the site for the implementation of management policy concerning
44

45
46

Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (New Haven, Yale
University Press 2006).
Jones, Pollitt and Bek, loc. cit. n. 31.
Streeck, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 37.
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restructuring, plant relocation and closing. On the other, works councils
could come to be seen as potentially important players in tapping,
structuring and realising knowledge and capacity pools that exist within
the firm. The latter, more positive perspective on workers’ involvement in
the firm provides a friendly contrast to the before-mentioned development.

3.
The global and the local: spaces and places of
convergence and divergence
The following section will place these observations into the context of the
contemporary corporate law-making environment in the European Union
and Germany (in particular with a view to complementing official rules
with unofficial ones such as soft norms, recommendations and codes of
conduct). Before this, however, it is necessary to allude briefly to the
larger conceptual framework in which these developments have been
taking place. Today, contemporary global developments demand the
attention of domestic law reformers in the areas of corporate law and
securities regulation. There are different ways, in which national
governments or, in the case of the European Union, regional lawmakers,
have been reacting to international developments. The post-Cold War
opening of formerly closed markets, along with the large-scale
restructuring of publicly financed services and infrastructures and their
replacement by privatisation and deregulation, has fundamentally altered
the playing field for business corporations, investors and interest groups,
as well as for domestic and transnational regulators.
Table 1: The End(s) of History
END OF HISTORY I
Francis Fukuyama 1992: End of History
Michel Albert 1991: Capitalisme contra Capitalisme
END OF HISTORY II
Hall/Soskice 2001: Varieties of Capitalism
Hansmann/Kraakman 2001: End of History in Corporate Law
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To trace how these global developments translate in a domestic and a
regional context, the following subsection will take a closer look at both
the EU company law scene and the corporate law reform process currently
taking place in Germany.

3.1

Germany’s company law reform and changing regulatory
landscapes

The 1980s and 1990s in Germany were a period of difficult bargaining
between a pro-shareholder government and deeply entrenched
stakeholders, unions and lobby groups. With the end of Social Democratic
government in 1982, the Christian Democratic/Liberal majority took
power in 1983. In 1998, at the end of Christian Democratic rule, the first
major corporate law reform legislation since the 1960s was finally
adopted. The Law on Corporate Control and Transparency (KonTraG)
introduced a number of elements designed to improve German corporate
governance, long criticised for its less developed disclosure rules and,
importantly, for its already mentioned two-tier board, in which worker
representatives have half the seats on the supervisory board – but as we
have seen – not half the votes, as the chairman, a shareholder
representative, has the deciding vote.
The KonTraG left this structure untouched, as well as the high number
of seats on the supervisory board, and thereby failed to satisfy
longstanding demands to change the German system and make the
supervisory board more effective.47 The German debate concerning the
reform of the supervisory board has not lost in intensity and has indeed
47

For an excellent discussion of these changes, see only John W. Cioffi,
‘Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Corporate Governance
Reform in Germany and the European Union’, 24 Law & Policy (2002) p.
355; John W. Cioffi, ‘Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and
the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany’, 7
German L. J. (2006) p. 533.
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received renewed input from a combination of forces both at the domestic
and the transnational and European level.
Domestic corporate law reform discussions such as those in Germany48
or in other countries49 are takingplace in the light of a European and global
debate over competition for mobile capital and how corporate law systems
might accommodate companies’ needs to tap into these capital markets
without boundaries.50 At the same time, the debate is taking place against
the background of a complex European integration process in which the
political and cultural outcome remains unsettled.51
It is obvious that, within the European Union, the varieties of
capitalism approach is of great significance, for it explicitly addresses the
embedded, historically grown socio-political and cultural systems of the
Member States.52 How difficult it would be to achieve any harmonisation
of company law standards in Europe given the high degree of diversity of
existing company law regimes was strongly evidenced by the decadeslong struggle over the European Company, originally initiated as early as
48

49

50

51

52

See, e.g., Baums (2003), loc. cit. n. 24; Ulrich Seibert, ‘The Company Law
Reform Projects of the German Ministry of Justice’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (2005) p. 712; Ulrich Noack
and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Second Decade’,
Center for Business and Corporate Law (CBC) Research Paper Series (2005).
Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Guidici and Maria Stella Richter, ‘Company Law
Reform in Italy: Real Progress?’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und
internationales Privatrecht (2005) p. 658; Eilís Ferran, ‘The Company Law
Reform in the United Kingdom: A Progress Report’, ibid., pp. 629-657;
Michel Menjucq, ‘The Company Law Reform in France’, ibid., pp. 698-711;
Claude Champaud and Didier Danet, ‘NRE’, Revue trimestrielle de droit
commercial e de droit économique (2002) p. 17.
See the contributions in Steven Weber, ed., Globalization and the European
Political Economy (New York, Columbia University Press 2001).
Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L. J. (1991) p.
2403; Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic?
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999); Christian Joerges, ‘The Law’s
Problems with the Governance of the European Market’, in Christian Joerges
and Renaud Dehousse, eds., Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 3; Christoph Möllers, ‘European
Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’, 43 Common Market Law
Review (2006) p. 313.
Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11.
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the 1970s and adopted after many compromises in 2001.53 Another
example of the European varieties of capitalism in the field is the almost
fifteen-year-long fight over a European Takeover Directive. This was
concluded only in 2004, resulting in a directive that contains so many optout clauses, that the question has been asked whether it has led to any
harmonisation at all.54
International attention is usually attracted by the noise that surrounds
the larger developments, such as European directives or the corporate
governance standards promulgated by international bodies such as the
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) or by
domestic legislators (such as the US Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002). Less
attention is focused on the dramatically more complex forms of law
reform that take place at other levels and are not so easily discernable by
the outside spectator. Examples of such reforms can be found within the
myriad ways in which Member States move to implement European law
into their domestic legal orders. While there are straightforward and easy
ways to track reforms, as for example when a Member State passes a law
that appears to translate a European directive into its domestic legal
framework, in reality such law-making processes take very different forms
within hotly contested fields. In short, they take place in many unofficial,
harder to trace ways, as the landscape of norm making in corporate law (as
in many other areas) has been changing dramatically. The emergence of
privately made best practice guidelines, codes of conduct and corporate
governance codes has led to a far-reaching change of the relevant
regulatory landscape in which companies operate today.55 But many of its
53

54

55

Erik Werlauff, ‘The SE Company – A New Common European Company
from 8 October 2004’, 14 European Business Law Review (2003) p. 85;
Christoph Teichmann, ‘The European Company – A Challenge to Academics,
Legislatures and Practitioners’, 4 German L. J. (2003) p. 309.
Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Takeover Defenses under
Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German
Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform’, 50 American
Journal of Comparative Law (2002) p. 451; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 17.
Ben Pettet, ‘Combined Code: A Firm Place for Self-Regulation in Corporate
Governance’, 13 Journal of International Banking Law (1998) p. 394; Baums
(2001), loc. cit. n. 24; Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Privatization of Corporate Law?
Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-Regulation’, Juridikum
(2002) p. 136; Johannes Köndgen, ‘Privatisierung des Rechts. Private
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features and elements are not – and arguably cannot – be truthfully
represented and documented in the official legislation. The proliferation of
private, semi-public and quasi-public lawmakers in the fields of corporate
and securities law has altered the regulatory landscape so that it has
become much harder to develop a political critique of the processes as
they unfold. In corporate law, this is expressed by corporate governance
codes and best practice recommendations, as it is in the case of labour law
by codes of conduct, which purport to provide for a comprehensive
regulation of employment relationships.56 To be sure, the shift away from
traditional forms of law-making and the embrace of myriad ways of norm
creation (often summarised as ‘governance’) has had as one of its
consequences the highly problematic removal of many regulatory changes
from the political debate. In many cases, ‘demands’ of the market are
offered as sufficient justifications for legal change, effectively moving it
outside of the political arena of deliberation and contestation.
Illustrating this point are the deep-reaching changes to that element of
German corporate governance that seems to be at the core of the ‘end of
history’ critique of Germany’s need for reform, on the one hand, and of
Mark Roe’s characterisation of ‘social democratic’ corporate governance,
on the other.57 The here found depiction of the allegedly social democratic

56

57

Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung’, 206 AcP
(2006) p. 477.
For a critique, see Harry W. Arthurs, ‘Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights
in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour
Market Regulation’, in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl and Karl
Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization. Transformative Practices
and Possibilities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 471; Adelle
Blackett, ‘Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Law Regulatory State
in Developing Countries’, in John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds.,
Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment
and Social Governance (Aldershot, Ashgate 2004) p. 121; Zumbansen, loc.
cit. n. 16.
Roe, loc. cit. n. 4; Mark J. Roe, ‘German Co-Determination and German
Securities Markets’, in Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy
Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge, eds., Comparative Corporate Governance:
The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998)
p. 361; Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003).
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origins, nature and preservation of workers’ co-determination on company
boards may, however, blind our view to the much more nuanced,
ambiguous and multi-directional lines along which corporate governance
has been evolving.
Indeed, one of the most discussed features of German company law –
co-determination – has been attracting scathing criticism from the press,
both from lobbyists who fear the negative signal co-determination sends to
prospective and much needed international investors and from scholars.58
Even the national lawyers’ meeting in the autumn of 2006 put codetermination on the agenda and openly explored its possible demise.59
These developments strongly suggest that even in Germany, one of the
heartlands of Michel Albert’s Rhenish capitalism,60 there is a shift towards
a more shareholder-driven corporate governance regime.61
However, what the bird’s eye view of the observer fails to capture is
the altogether ambivalent process – both politically and institutionally –
that characterises German company law reform. Here, the point is that the
legal reform agenda is driven by an intricate and, for German traditions,
seemingly unprecedented combination of official and unofficial lawmaking.62 The currently pursued reform agenda is the result of federal
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See references supra n. 21.
See Strüve, loc. cit. n. 29, at p. 5.
Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (Paris, Editions du Seuil
1991).
See Cioffi (2006), loc. cit. n. 47.
See the increasing number of scholarly assessments of this process: Peter
Hommelhoff and Martin Schwab, ‘Staats-ersetzende Privatgremien im
Unternehmensrecht’, in Walter Drenseck and Roman Seer, eds., Festschrift
für Heinrich Wilhelm Kruse zum 70. Geburtstag (Cologne, Schmidt 2001) p.
693; Stefan Berg and Mathias Stöcker, ‘Anwendungs- und Haftungsfragen
zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex’, 56 Wertpapiermitteilungen
(2002) p. 1569; Marcus Lutter, ‘Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen
Organe: Corporate Governance – ein internationales Thema’, 24 Jura (2002)
p. 83; Christoph H. Seibt, ‘Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und
Entsprechenserklärung (§ 161 AktG-E)’, 47 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2002) p.
249; Gregor Bachmann, ‘Der “Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex”:
Rechtswirkungen und Haftungsrisiken’, Wertpapiermitteilungen (2002) p.
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law-making and the work of an expert commission that was initiated by
the government in 2000.63 That commission resulted in the issuance of
detailed marching orders, recommendations and demands for the legislator
as to how to adapt the German company law system to the ‘needs of
global financial markets’.64 On the other hand, the commission also
suggested the creation of a follow-on commission to draft a code of best
practices, the so-called German Corporate Governance Code.65 An early
discussion regarding the Code’s legal nature quietly subsided.66 A
comprehensive law reform in corporate law, which was initiated by the
Social Democratic government at the time, seems to turn the dearly held
cliché of Germany’s stakeholder capitalism company law regime on its
head. The first and the second commissions, in preparing the legislative
design and the collection of best practice guidelines, ingeniously managed
to adopt allegedly universal models and terms through which they
prepared the field for the major overhaul. But while everybody expected
that this would mean the abolition of co-determination, change occurred in
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2137; Georg Borges, ‘Selbstregulierung im Gesellschaftsrecht – zur Bindung
an Corporate Governance-Kodices’, 32 ZGR (2003) p. 508.
Baums (2001), loc. cit. n. 24; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 55.
Theodor Baums, ed., Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate
Governance. Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung
des Aktienrechts (Cologne, Otto Schmidt 2001).
Gerhard Cromme (Chairman), German Corporate Governance Code, drafted
by the German Corporate Governance Commission, Berlin, 26 February
2002,
available
at:
<http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/CorGov_Endfassung_E.pdf>.
Martin Wolf, ‘Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher “SelfRegulation” im Widerstreit zum deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt’, 35
Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2002) p. 59; Paul Kirchhof, ‘Demokratie ohne
parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?’, 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001)
p. 1332; Wolfgang Seidel, ‘Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage’, Neue Zeitschrift
für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) (2004) p. 1095; Markus Heintzen, ‘Der
Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex aus der Sicht des deutschen
Verfassungsrechts’, 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2004) p. 1933;
Henrik-Michael Ringleb, Thomas Kremer, Marcus Lutter and Axel von
Werder, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (KodexKommentar), 2nd edn. (Munich, Beck 2005) pp. 27-30: arguing that both the
Baums Commission and the legislator intended the core of the Code to consist
of non-binding recommendations for which no statutory authorisation would
be necessary.
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much more subtle, but clearly no less dramatic ways. The government did
not openly attack co-determination, while the semi-political, quasi-public
expert body – the commission – silently and effectively worked towards
its deconstruction. Certainly, the recommendations pertaining to the
isolation of the inter-shareholder dialogue from that of the stakeholders
(the employees and union representatives)67 must be seen within the
context of the post-Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art fallout within the
European company law scene.68 That scene, as regards the disembedded
operationability of the incorporation theory for European companies
seeing a dramatic increase in the mobility increase of companies, is still in
search of the best legislative fix.69
This change in the German approach, which has led to a larger role for
unofficial, indirect forms of law-making,70 has important lessons to offer
for our current and future appreciation of the European company law
scene. It is here where we would still harbour hopes as to the preservation
not only of difference with regard to the long-standing legal and socioeconomic cultures in the Member States but also with regard to the
preservation of an open eye for the forms in which law reform has been
taking place in recent years across the globe.
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See section 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance Code, available at:
<http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/E_CorGov_Endfassung_June_2006_highlighted.pdf>.
Christian Kersting and Clemens Christian Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire Art
Decision of 30 September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice’, 4 German Law
Journal (2003) p. 1277.
Dammann, loc. cit. n. 29.
The Code’s recommendation in section 3.6, see supra n. 38 [67 ???], has
already found followers. See, for example, the 2006 Corporate Governance
Report
from
the
METROGROUP,
available
at:
<http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/show/1119290/GB2006-CorporateGovernance-Bericht-de.pdf>, which states explicitly that the Group has
endorsed the Code’s recommendation to prepare meetings of the supervisory
board separately among the shareholder representatives.
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The ‘European company law scene’: overcoming diversity?

The current European company law scene is characterised by an
interesting tension between different trends and dynamics. When
European scholars assessed the prospects of company law in Europe a
couple of decades ago, no one doubted its centrality in the making of a
more integrated market, both economically and politically.71 A few
decades down the road, the picture looks much different. What began with
high hopes for harmonised and unified corporate law rules among the EC
Member States eventually resulted in a series of increasingly long and
exhausting law-making initiatives, the success of which in many cases
depended on or was prevented by national resistance politics. While the
European legislator made considerably little progress in the area of
company law,72 this was not the case for capital markets law, where
various regulations came out of Brussels. With regard to the diversity of
company laws in Europe, this was for a long time and, indeed, until very
recently seen as a particular feature and characteristic aspect of the
European company law scene. While it made consensus finding difficult
in areas where change was recognised as being desirable, these obstacles
made everyone sensitive to the existing variations in corporate law
regimes and culture. The latter was always taken with a grain of salt
among Europeans: while it reflected on the diversity within Europe, it was
also seen as a problem with regard to corporate mobility in Europe and the
attractiveness of European firms for international investors.
This diversity has recently come to be seen in a different light. Reform
attempts in recent years have regularly included eloquent references – and
reverences – to the existing diversity. At the same time, a number of
developments suggest that the time for diversity might have come. For
one, the Commission has taken several steps toward reinvigorating law
reform in this area. These have grown out of the lengthy adoption process
71
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for two recent company law directives, one concerning corporate
takeovers and the other one to the creation of a European Company
Statute.73 Both were examples of drawn-out, tiresome and complex
negotiation struggles, one of which occupied lawmakers for some thirty
years, while the other one occupied almost half of that. In gearing up for a
safe adoption of the Takeover Directive, the Commission initiated an
expert committee process out of which grew, in quick succession, two of
the first comprehensive reports on the law relating to takeovers and the
state of European company law in general.74 These reports did not remain
alone for long. At both the European and the Member State level, we are
seeing a plethora of committee reports, expert findings, recommendations
and self-regulatory codes. For the Commission, this has lead to a certain
differentiation of its law-making agenda and methodology. Realising the
political obstacles that stand in the way of harmonisation in specific core
areas (e.g. board composition), the turn to soft law, benchmarking and
self-regulation promises a viable alternative.
However, there is another development that has a great impact on the
shaping of the European company law scene. The already mentioned case
law of the ECJ has dramatically altered the framework within which
European managers are thinking about where to incorporate. The Court’s
rejection of national governments’ attempts at preventing foreign
European companies form forming subsidiaries in another European state
has also put Member State lawmakers under increased pressure to revisit
their existing company law regimes. Hence, following the case law in
Centros (1999), Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art (2003), national
governments throughout Europe have begun to make far-reaching changes
to their applicable company law rules to render their legal frameworks
attractive under incorporation considerations.75
73
74

75

Teichmann, loc. cit. n. 53, available at: <http://www.germanlawjournal.com>.
The so-called ‘Winter Reports I and II’, named after their chairman, Dutch
law professor Jaap Winter. See also Frits Bolkestein, ‘The Takeover
Directive: A Commission Perspective Address’, Speech at the Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels 4 March 2003; Silja Maul and Athanasios
Kouloridas, ‘The Takeover Bids Directive’, 5 German Law Journal (2004) p.
355.
Kilian Bälz and Teresa Baldwin, ‘The End of the Real Seat Theory
(Sitztheorie): The European Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5

25

26

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

It is against this two-fold background that we have to assess the current
European company law scene. The debate concerning the degree to which
the ECJ’s case law might have initiated a US-style process of regulatory
competition is still ongoing.76 At the same time, the shape and structure of
company law in Europe seems to be driven to a large extent by the already
mentioned myriad forms of soft law and indirect regulation that have
come to the fore in recent years.77 Suffice it to point to the multi-level
nature of these processes at the EU and the domestic Member State level
to show how this levelled structure is eventually much more complicated,
due to the fact that the relevant norms grow out of reports, codes and other
forms of soft law. This makes a straightforward assessment of the changes
in the law dependent on the changes on the ground. In other words,
without a better view of how codes are implemented, how firms are
actually responding to various suggestions of indirect and voluntary
regulation, there can hardly be a satisfying evaluation of the changing
company law scene.78 What really matters in this respect, however, is that
without a proper assessment of the changes ‘on the ground’ we will fail to
appreciate how these many soft and indirect forms of norm-making,
andthe many ways in which companies have been marketing their
commitment to specific corporate governance or corporate social
responsibility standards, are reflective of an important shift in law-making.
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While the noted cases of national resistance to company law
harmonisation put the political nature of corporate law in the spotlight, this
space is rather dimly lit when it comes to soft law and self-regulation.
Ironically, these norms are regularly not presented as law at all, because
they do not have their origin in the state nor are they equipped with the
traditional enforcement instruments that we know from state-made laws.
Given their apparent distance from the state – and their proximity to the
market – soft laws are understood as private norms without any real
footing in the political sphere of the state’s law-making arena.79 It is this
removal of indirect corporate law regulation from the political sphere that
provokes the question whose interests are really served in the long run in
this scenario. Given that a certain lobbying group succeeds in dominating
the market for ideas with a certain concept for a while, what happens if the
market begins to shift? Not only does the formerly successful concept
allegedly lose the support of other market actors, but dependent personnel,
employees, creditors and others involved with the firm might also suffer
from a change in corporate organisation. We might just think this a natural
effect of market actors’ self-regulation and accept them as collateral. We
might also, however, stop to think whether self-regulation can adequately
capture and channel all of the involved stakeholders’ concerns in the
different features of the firm’s organisation and governance. In other
words, where we pursue corporate law reform and realise the need to
overcome political deadlock that arises from path dependent, deeply
embedded, politically, legally and culturally backed regulatory regimes,
we would be well advised not to dismiss these features of embeddedness
and the role of the law in this context.
What should be seen as the most pressing of challenges in this regard is
how to reconnect our ongoing assessment of the fast changing and
continuously evolving modes of transnational governance, in the European
Union80 and generally,81 with a critical inquiry into national law-making
79
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trajectories and the justifications offered in their support. One of the
institutions engaged in a complex, interwoven process of negotiation
facilitation and promotion of best practices is the European Corporate
Governance Forum,82 established in pursuance to a recommendation of the
Winter II Group in their November 2002 report on European Company
Law.83 The expert commission made it clear that such a structure, while
facilitating a process and eventual results that would themselves be
‘voluntary and non-binding’, would be necessary in order to effectively
work towards an improvement of corporate governance regimes.84 In fact,
what we can observe to be arising from the European Corporate
Governance Forum’s work in recent times is a far-reaching collectionof
policy recommendations and lawmaking proposals that are portrayed as
resulting from a quasi-natural process of almost technical content.85 ‘Good
corporate governance’ has emerged as the regularly used formula to
express the plethora of considerations that have informed the deliberations
among the forum’s members. In the light of the alluded-to contestations of
a convergence of corporate governance regimes and the ongoing
explorations into the different elements of corporate governance, we are
asked to further assess the merits of regulatory competition86 and the
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apparent triumph of a finance perspective on the corporation.87 To be sure,
‘good (corporate) governance’ results from an intricate and complex
process of ongoing political contestation and organizational
experimentation. The latter is driven by economic competition and
stakeholder dynamics that have begun to surpass the post-war paradigm of
“industrial pluralism” to include today a much wider and more
differentiated wealth of societal rationalities. The corporation of the 21st
century can only inadequately be captured through the polarity of
shareholder and stakeholder interests. Instead, as both constituencies are
transforming our description of the firm itself must change. Elements of
change include corporations’ assumption of large-scale public functions
with regard to old-age pensions and public service delivery, far-reaching
alterations of corporations’ ownership structures and, finally, the degree to
which firms become ever-more versatile and flexible organizations within
a transnational knowledge economy. The concluding section will explore
these perspectives now in more detail.

4.

The learning firm

4.1

The transnational regulatory challenges of corporate
governance reform

This paper began by taking a perspective on the role of the employee in
the firm. This focus has helped to illustrate the current regulatory
framework for workers’ involvement in firm management. Moreover, a
study of contemporary developments in corporate governance has revealed
that a discussion of co-determination forms but a part of a much larger
reflection process on corporate governance rules. While there has been a
long-standing debate as to the substantive goals of corporate law
regulation,88 this discussion has been rendered intricately more complex
due in part to the fact that the perspectives on corporate law have been
87
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multiplied, enriched and widespread, making corporate law the ‘hottest
game in town’.89 Another reason why corporate law is increasingly
recognised as a very promising field in terms of research and reform
potential90 also has to do with the field’s fascinating and challenging
regulatory dimensions. The proliferation of law-making arenas in the area
of corporate law at the domestic, transnational and international level
constitutes a prime challenge to traditional understandings of domestic
bodies of corporate law with an occasional comparative glance to the right
or the left of one’s borders. Instead, corporate law has advanced to being
one of the most highly researched fields in terms of doctrinal,
comparative, economic, organisational, historical and political
approaches.91 Before long, the immense impact of these changes will be
noticed and translated into core corporate law curricula as well. The
changing forms of law-making and the ensuing multi-jurisdictional
competition between official and unofficial, soft and hard norms in
corporate regulation constitute a formidably complex landscape, the
exploration of which has only just begun.
The focus on management and employees, however, was taken to open
the door to an analysis of the corporation that would not limit its inquiry to
traditional elements of monitoring management, even if that included
occasional assessments, for example, of the German two-tier board and
worker co-determination in supervisory boards.92 Instead, the moving of
employees into the present corporate governance spotlight was aimed at
eventually gaining a better picture of what constitutes ‘good’ corporate
governance on the organisational level. It is this level, which is often
neglected in corporate law scholarship, that remains for the most part
within a rights paradigm of the corporation.93 While the combination of
89
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structural analysis of the assigned rights of those invested in the
corporation with a particular view on the economic results of a particular
regime has the advantage of illuminating the tensions among different
economic interests within and around the corporation,94 it appears to fall
short of capturing the processes and institutional dimensions of the firm in
operation.95
4.2

Beyond the shareholder v. stakeholder divide: the StrineBainbridge debate of 2007

Without a better understanding of the processes within the firm that result
from an institutional interaction within and outside the firm’s boundaries,
it is hard to imagine one would ever be in a position to make reasonable
assessments about the connection between corporate governance and
economic performance. The picture changes, however, if the concept of
corporate governance is redefined by drawing on the wider institutional
perspective alluded to before. Where varieties of capitalism scholars have
importantly advanced our understanding of the market structures that are
conducive to and interacting with particular governance strategies and
structures, this perspective must be complemented in two ways. One is the
integration of a regulatory theory approach to the understanding of
corporate governance developments. Given the proliferation of norm
producers, localities and spheres for corporate rule-making, any
assessment of corporate governance developments must take this
regulatory dimension into account.
The second complementing perspective is directed at the structures of
the corporation itself. The two models that we have learned to identify as
being situated at opposite ends of the spectrum are the nexus-of-contracts
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conception of the corporation,96 on the one hand, and the corporation as a
social/political/organic entity,97 on the other. A recent articulation of the
corporation as a ‘social institution’ was provided by Vice Chancellor Leo
Strine, Jr., who argued that
both management and labour are likely to view a public corporation
as something more than a nexus of contracts, as more akin to a
social institution that, albeit having the ultimate goal of producing
profits for stockholders, also durably serves and exemplifies other
societal values. In particular, both management and labor recoil at
the notion that a corporation’s worth can be summed upentirely by
the current price the equity markets place on its stock, much less that
the immediate demands of the stock market should thwart the longterm pursuit of corporate growth.98
An intimate expert of US corporate governance politics with an ear close
to the ground, Strine aptly identifies the blind spots in the reigning and
raging ‘corporate governance industry’ made up of ‘public pension fund
administrators, proxy advisory and corporate governance ratings
organisations, corporate law scholars, and business journalists’.99 Strine
directs his critique at the heart of the dominant school of thought, which
contends that the Berle and Means challenge of overcoming the separation
of ownership and control still stands. In contrast, Strine argues that given
96
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the high concentration of stocks in institutional investors, the Berle and
Means equation has been reversed, now in favour of stockholders. But
who are they? For one thing, the reality of stock market-based old-age
pensions turns most employees into ‘forced’ capitalists, although they
hardly ‘own’ anything directly. The owners are large institutional
investors, intermediaries between employees and the firm.100 At the heart
of Strine’s critique, then, is his concern with an unceasing flow of
literature demanding shareholder empowerment against management that
stands in bizarre contrast to the disassociation of employees’ ownership
from exercising long-term, pension-oriented rights vis-à-vis ‘their’
corporation. He thus finds it particularly troubling that most of the current
corporate responsibility and corporate governance efforts are made
without the awareness that they eventually serve to empower not those
with long-term interests in the viability of the corporation but rather
intermediaries with less clearly demarcated interests, which might
frequently be directed towards high short-term returns than long-term
sustained performance.
Immediately contested,101 Strine’s suggestions focus on appropriate
means of shareholder empowerment precisely with the goal of identifying
the long-term orientations of a firm’s strategic outfit in order to disclose to
stockholders in greater detail where a company stands and where its
dominating investors intend to take it.102 Instead of ‘feeding the market
beast’, as was the case before the market meltdown in Enron and
Worldcom, efforts should be made to improve disclosure rules that would
‘enable managers to focus more on sustainable, long-term corporate
growth and less on the market’s short-term expectations.’103 Interestingly
enough, it is the critic of Strine’s common sense and shared interests
approach who returns the analysis to an atomised interest pluralism model,
which allows him to purportedly dismiss Strine’s contentions regarding
100
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such shared interests. Claiming that the degree of diversity among the
different corporate stakeholders effectively defeats any contention of
shared values between the firm’s constituencies, Bainbridge evades the
central challenge that Strine formulates, namely, to recognise that both
management and employees share a basic interest in the sustained success
of a business enterprise. Regrettably, for the time being, Bainbridge
dismisses this claim, without pursuing further the idea what it would mean
for our understanding of a firm’s constituencies and the firm itself if we
adopted a more wholesome approach to the firm and its stakeholders.
4.3

Corporate decision making in the knowledge society

In the following, I want to suggest an alternative perspective on the
corporation. For this purpose, I put forward the thesis that neither the
contractual nor the interest pluralism paradigms of the corporation can
fully illuminate the internal workings of the firm. In particular, neither
approach can adequately identify or assess the processes by which
knowledge is generated, disseminated and executed within the corporation
or, in other words, which processes in fact precede and inform any
decision made by corporate management. While the contract model of the
corporation remains confined to explaining corporate decision making
with regard to agreements among the firm’s stakeholders, even in cases of
so-called ‘incomplete contracts’,104 the interest pluralism model of the
corporation tends to one-sidedly focus on identifiable interests of specific
stakeholders of the firm such as employees, unions or creditors.105 This
also appears to be true in the most recent Strine-Bainbridge dialogue. In
contrast, a possibly more promising perspective on the firm’s institutional
nature in making decisions possible could start with the premise that the
elements shaping corporate decisions are never in a static, foreseeable or
fully determinable state. Rather, corporate decision making by necessity
involves a high-risk assessment of uncertain development trajectories,
market strategies and product conceptualisations. The complexity of the
104
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field to be assessed by management must be reflected in the way in which
we speak about the regulation of corporate activity. From this perspective,
then, the firm itself moves into the centre of attention. In other words,
corporate governance that claims to effectively address the core challenges
of governing a corporation must take the particular features of a firm’s
decision-making processes into consideration.
Accordingly, it is this second complementary perspective that will be
unfolded in more detail in the remainder of this paper. The key to
understanding the contemporary corporation in the political economy of
the de-territorialised knowledge economy is to focus on its capacity to
remain innovative.106 The firm’s capacity to engage in innovative
production depends on its ability to constantly grow, adapt and learn. This
it can do by letting go of traditional modes of command and control and
instead embracing an ironic, detached, reflective and post-heroic attitude
to corporate governance and management. The corporation becomes an
‘interpreting system that constantly observes its environment, its markets,
competitors, customers and suppliers in search of gaps that it may fill
itself. The corporation is under incessant pressure to develop and fill its
own niche while everything else remains in constant change, including its
niche.’107 Our urgently sought definition of the corporation’s
responsibilities, its public duties and obligations to society at large,
especially in an era of scandalous corporate crime, depends entirely on our
understanding of the firm itself. It is here that we recognise the relevance
for our theme of the fierce battle between shareholder value- oriented
systems of corporate control and those that place a higher emphasis on
workers’ voice, participation, industrial relations and a wider
consideration of the firm’s stakeholders.108 Whether we emphasise the
shareholder or the stakeholder dimension of the firm will have a
significant impact on our assignment of duties and obligations to the
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firm.109 This is particularly relevant with regard to disclosure.110 In cases
where corporate governance reform is predominantly concerned with
shareholders, the emphasis is likely to remain placed – at least for the time
being – on improvements in financial auditing schemes. In contrast, if we
were to focus on an improved environmental accountability of the firm,
we would indeed direct our initiatives at other areas of corporate
organisation. In fact, environmental internal auditing constitutes a prime
example of the latter developments in environmental corporate selfregulation.111 In other words, the question of the firm’s responsibilities
cannot be separated from a more refined understanding of the firm in its
various, highly differentiated and specialised contexts.
From the perspective of the firm within a functionally differentiated
knowledge society, even the connection made between the political
economy of the firm and the firm’s environmental (or wider social)
responsibilities would still provide only an insufficient account of the
corporation itself. Today’s large, publicly held and globally operating
firms escape clear definitions, both with regard to their core activities or
‘competences’112 and their organisational structure. Increasingly, firms
have become unbounded, borderless and virtual, with activities that span
multiple areas of industry, manufacture, products or services. Echoing
many of the challenges that the state faces today in a complex society, the
firm constitutes a highly complex organisation that operates in a volatile
regulatory and competitive environment, which is at its heart characterised
by a fast evolving body of specialised knowledge. We should thus reject
both overly simplistic categorisations of the firm as either shareholder- or
stakeholder-oriented, as the firm of the twenty-first century challenges our
learned ways of organising social behaviour. Shifting both the corporate
109
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social responsibility [CSR] and the corporate governance debate away
from the control-oriented images of the corporation, with its focus on the
struggle between shareholders and stakeholders, is an essential first step in
beginning to rephrase the question of the firm’s societal functions.
Questioning the definitional clarity of CSR’s term ‘social’ as such, the
firm must be viewed within a complex web made up of socio-economic,
political and cultural factors, in which the corporation is embedded. The
various functions that a corporation is assuming have repercussions on the
evolution of corporate governance well beyond an oppositional model of
shareholder v. stakeholder interests.
From the perspective of society as an ongoing communication process
of different rationalities, corporate governance can adequately be
understood as an ongoing process of organisational experiments113 within
a constantly evolving business enterprise, operating in a polycontextual
environment. It is in this light that the ongoing discussion over the
convergence or divergence of corporate governance regimes must take
into account the particular embeddedness of the firm within historically
grown, and functionally evolving socio-economic and political contexts.
Today’s corporations are placed within a constantly changing environment
that is determined functionally rather than territorially or politically. While
specific local regulatory influences on the operation of the firm are of
importance, the firm’s corporate governance regime is shaped by the
functional elements of the firm’s operation. For example, with
corporations’ increasingly important assumptions of formerly public
functions such as welfare, pensions or medical care, it has long become
questionable whether a corporation can be adequately described as either
private or public in nature. While such contestations of the nature of the
business enterprise already have a considerable legacy,114 the functionalist
critique of both the shareholder v. stakeholder paradigm of corporate
governance and the public-private divide in determining the nature of the
firm goes much further still. From the perspective of societal functional
differentiation, it is a mere historical contingency that the discussion of
113
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corporate governance would be dominated – for some time – by such
connotations as ‘shareholders’ and ‘stakeholders’, on the one hand, and
the public v. private nature of the corporation, on the other. While
varieties of capitalism scholarship succeeds in reiterating the contextuality
of corporate governance development, it still has to be developed further
to move away from contentions of path dependency, and thus upheld
claims of persisting divergence, in order to recognise the complexity in
which the business corporation is the collision site of different societal
rationalities.

